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PATTERSON v. MCLEAN CREDIT UNION
by Merrick T. Rossein"
"What the Court declines to snatch away
with one hand, it takes with the other."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,2 the Supreme Court
continued the trend established during its 1988-89 Term by severely
limiting the reach of the Reconstruction Era statutes3 and title VII of the
Civil Rights Act' as they apply to remedying discrimination in the
employment context.5 In a five to four decision, the Court held that a
racially motivated refusal to hire violates § 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act,' while a practice of racial harassment adopted after an employee was
hired does not by itself violate the employee's rights under the statute.
The procedural history of the Patterson case indicates the majority's
hostility to civil rights law enforcement, particularly in the area of
employment discrimination.
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School at Queens
College. B.A. 1967, Alfred University;, M.P.A. 1972, New York University; J.D. 1975,
Antioch School of Law. Author, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
(Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., 1990) (a comprehensive treatise covering title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 200Oe-17 (1988)), the Reconstruction
Era statutes (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3)), and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206)) (Copyright 1990 by
Merrick T. Rossein).
1. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2379 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986, 1988 (1988). See also U.S. CONS. amend.
XIII, § 2.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
5. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T
Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). But see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (the Supreme Court lightened the burden
of proof for plaintiffs in "mixed-motive" sex-discrimination actions, ie., cases that involve
both permissible and impermissible reasons for adverse employment decisions).
6. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted as amended pursuant to the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment at Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114,
16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
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When the case was first accepted and argued in the 1988-89 Term,
the Court was presented with two questions: first, whether § 1981
encompassed a claim of racial discrimination in the terms and conditions
of employment, including a claim that petitioner was harassed because of
her race;7 and second, whether the district court erred in instructing the
jury that for the plaintiff to prevail on her claim of discrimination in
promotion she must prove that she was more qualified than the white
person who received the promotion.8
After argument, the court sua sponte raised a new issue: whether
or not the interpretation of § 1981 adopted by the Court in Runyon v.
McCrary9 should be reconsidered.1" The Court's decision to reopen this
thirteen-year precedent, which held that § 1981 reached private
discrimination in a school context, was met with an unusually sharp
dissenting opinion." This dissenting opinion was the firstin a series of
outcries against the Court's attempt to wreak havoc in the area of
employment discrimination litigation.
12
Although the court did not overrule the Runyon decision, it took
a scalpel to the guts of the first civil rights statute and severely limited the
reach of this statute in the employment context. The reaction to this
decision both editorially and in Congress was swift and condemnatory.
13
Consequently, it is likely that before this article is published, the United
States Congress will have reversed this decision through the enactment of
7. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
8. Id. at 2369, 2377.
9. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
10. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
11. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 619 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (dissent was concerned with preserving the "accepted doctrine of stare decisis').
12. See, e.g., infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. A brief amicus curiae
opposing the reversal of the Runyon case was submitted by 118 members of the House of
Representatives and 66 members of the Senate in addition to numerous other briefs
representing a wide spectrum of organizations in this country. See, e.g., Brief of the States,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107) (47 states, Puerto
Rico, District of Columbia, Guam and the Virgin Islands); Brief for American Jewish
Congress and 114 Other Organizations, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct.
2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
13. See, e.g., E. KENNEDY, REPORT TOGEIHER WITH MINoRrrY VIEWS, S. REP.
No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter KENNEDY REPORT]. Secretary of
Education Shirley M. Hufstedler described the Supreme Court's recent decisions as "an
enormous step backwards in the enforcement of civil rights legislation." Id. at 11. Former
Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall testified: "[M]any of the victims of discrimination feel that
the clock is being turned back, and that the nation's policy makers really are not serious




The Civil Rights Act of 199015 was introduced in the House of
16Representatives and the Senate, to, among other things, overturn the
Supreme Court's holding in Patterson.7 The Civil Rights Protection Act
of 1990 drafted by the Bush Administration and introduced in Congress on
February 20, 1990,18 also supports overturning Patterson. No significant
opposition has been voiced in Congress or the Executive branch to the
reversal of the Patterson decision. However, since the Patterson reversal
provision contained in the proposed legislation is part of a broader bill,
and because of significant employer and administration opposition, it is
possible that this provision's enactment will be delayed."
: . Part II of this article critically examines the Court's decision in
Patterson. As part of this discussion, the majority's attempt at ignoring or
masking the history of civil rights in the United States is explored. In Part
III, the critical differences between § 1981 and title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act are briefly highlighted. Part IV sets out some of the issues
remaining after Patterson, reviews lower courts' interpretation of the
Patterson holding, and presents various analyses to persuade the courts that
many adverse employment practices based on race are still unlawful under
§ 1981.
II. THE DECISION
The narrow five to four majority decision addressed three issues:
(1) whether the Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary should be
14. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 will amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore
and strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment.
15. See H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104,101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
[hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1990] (as introduced, both the Senate and House bills are
textually the same).
16. Id. See Pinzler, The Legislative Response, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. R"S. 123
(Symposium 1990) (discussing proposed legislation).
17. The bill has already received the support of a bi-partisan coalition of 50 Senators
and over 140 members of the House of Representatives. See KENNEDY REPORT, supra
note 13, at 37.
18. Id.
19. In addition to overruling a number of 1988-89 Supreme Court decisions the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 adds compensatory and punitive damages as well as jury trials for
certain title VII cases. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990) (§ 8
provides for damages in cases of intentional discrimination). Also, the bill extends the
statute of limitations from six months to two years at § 7. Id. at 13. See also Civil Rights
Act of 1990, supra note 15, § 7
Symp. 1990]
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overruled;' (2) whether claims of racial harassment are actionable under
§ 1981;"1 and (3) whether in a promotion claim the district court erred
when it instructed the jury that the plaintiff-minority had to prove that she
was better qualified than the white employee who received the
promotion.' The Court's answers to these questions and the concurring
and dissenting justices' responses are set out below.
The differences between the majority's view and the dissenters'
view of the first Reconstruction Era statute, with respect to whether claims
of racial harassment are actionable, are their respective understanding of,
or importance given to, the historical context in which the statute was
formed. For the majority, the fact that the institution of slavery still
existed, or that many citizens of formerly Confederate states actively
engaged in violence, intimidation, threats, and used Jim Crow laws2 to
reimpose a new form of servitude, seems lost or of no relevance. Although
the majority recognizes the fact that "[t]he law now reflects society's
consensus that discrimination based on the color of one's skin is a
profound wrong of tragic dimension,"' it is astounding that they
ultimately remove racial harassment as actionable under § 1981.25
Further, the majority's sparse accounting of the specific facts
raised by Brenda Patterson demonstrates its dehumanizing callousness
toward the victims of racial discrimination.' The cold, calculating legal
20. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2369, 2377.
23. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (the Court
engaged in a thorough analysis of the Reconstruction Era statutes; this analysis
presupposed that the statutes were designed, at least in part, to combat the Jim Crow laws
and the Black Codes, both of which imposed severe restrictions on the freedmen in an
effort to replicate pre-emanation conditions).
24. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379.
25. Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1981 provides: "All
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right... to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings ... as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988).
26. Brenda Patterson testified that her supervisor
periodically stared at her for several minutes at a
time; that he gave her too many tasks, causing her
to complain that she was under too much
pressure; that among the tasks given her were
sweeping and dusting, jobs not given to white
employees. On one occasion, she testified, [her
supervisor] told [her] that blacks are known to
work slower than whites. According to
Symp. 1990] PATTERSON v. McLEAN
argumentation used by the majority to advance their views of our society
needs to be exposed, not only in the courts, but throughout all sectors of
society. Even if the Patterson and other retrogressive 1988-89 Term
decisions of the Court are reversed by enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, the Patterson majority's hostility to people of color and women
will remain intact.
A. On Reversing Runyon -- It Seems So Clear Now
In declining to overrule the Court's decision in Runyon, the
majority beat a quick retreat from its sua sponte resurrection of this issue
when, in the 1988-89 Term, it asked the parties to brief and argue this
question not raised by either party.' After applying the doctrine of stare
decisis to the Runyon holding, the majority decided that the "fundamental
importance of this doctrine"' outweighed the asserted grounds for
reversal of Runyon.2 Having exhaustively searched for a "special
justification" for overruling Runyon, the Court had no choice but to affirm
the original holding. Further, noting that Runyon did not cause "inherent
confusion created by an unworkable decision,... pose[] a direct obstacle
to the realization of important objectives embodied in other laws,"" or
become "more vulnerable as it becomes outdated and after being 'tested by
experience, has been found inconsistent with the sense of justice or with
the social welfare,'"31 the Court resumed its analysis of the issues
originally granted certiorari. With respect to the third possible justification
for overruling a prior case, the Court wrote:
Whether Runyon's interpretation of § 1981 as prohibiting
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
private contracts is right or wrong as an original matter,
it is certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing
sense of justice in this country. To the contrary, Runyon
[Patterson, her supervisor] also criticized her in
staff meetings while not similarly criticizing white
employees.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
27. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
28. Id. at 2370 (citing Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 494 (1987)).
29. Id. at 2369.
30. Id. at 2371 (citations omitted).
31. Id. (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921))).
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is entirely consistent with our society's deep commitment
to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's
race or the color of his or her skin.32
Lastly, in responding to an argument posed by Justice Brennan's dissent,33
the majority agreed that the doctrine of stare decisis is further supported
in cases of statutory interpretation because Congress could have amended
the statute. 4
The majority's opinion reads as if there were no plausible reasons
to consider overruling Runyon. The matter-of-fact rejection of its own
invitation to dash on the rocks a significant ruling makes one wonder what
their initial justification was for the attempted destruction of a crucial
remedy for racial discrimination practiced by private parties.3' One can
only speculate that President Reagan's appointment of Justice Kennedy,
eight years of consistent attacks on civil rights laws, and the virtual
nonenforcement of these laws by the federal government created a judicial
climate for the majority's blatant attempt to announce a retreat to an
earlier era without the usual legal argumentation.3
Having failed to accomplish the intended result under its initial
strategy, the majority instead tore much of the muscle from the body of
§ 1981 in Patterson by ruling that a claim of racial harassment adopted
after hiring does not by itself fall within the enumerated rights of the
statute.37
32. Id. at 2371 (citations omitted).
33. See id. at 2379; id. at 2380-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2371-72 n.1 (the majority rejected Justice Brennan's argument that
congressional inaction is supportive of stare decisis).
35. Numerous decisions have held that § 1981 prohibits intentional discrimination
based on race in the making and enforcement of private contracts, as well as in state action
affecting individuals' ability to make and enforce contracts. See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at
168; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973).
36. See M. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATON LAW AND LmGATON § 1.1,
at 1-6 n.10 (1990). In announcing its reversal of an eighteen-year-old precedent in the title
VII context one week before the Patterson decision was released, the Court effectively
repealed a substantive provision of title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. 2115 (1989) (effectively repealed §§701-703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20Oe-2(a)). However, the Court reasoned that it did not really
reverse the burdens of proof, but simply clarified a mere procedural point by
.acknowledg[ing] that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise."
Id. at 2125-26.
37. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
[Vol. VII
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B. The Gutting of § 1981 Through the Eradication of History
In holding that § 1981 does not cover a claim of racial
harassment,' the majority ignored compelling legislative and social
history. Rather than take cognizance of the compelling nature of history,
the majority reviewed and applied the "plain terms" of § 1981 and found
that the statute's protection applied only to the formation of a contract.39
Problems that arose after formation from conditions of continued
employment were not covered by § 1981.'
The majority found that § 1981 contained two provisions relevant
to contracts. First, all persons have the same rights as white citizens "to
make" contracts. 1 Second, all persons have the same rights as white
citizens "to enforce" contracts.4' Thus, the Court concluded that
discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts is prohibited.4"
According to the majority, such prohibition included refusal to
enter into a contract or to make an offer to contract with someone on
discriminatory terms.44  However, once a contractual relationship is
established, post-formation conduct is not covered by § 1981, including
breach of the contract or the "imposition of discriminatory working
conditions."45 These types of matters, explained the majority, are "more
naturally governed by state contract law and Title VII."4
The second guarantee of § 1981, the right to enforce contracts,
prohibits discrimination that interferes with the enforcement of this right.
Thus, a statute, practice, or private effort based on race to impede access
to the courts or non-judicial methods for adjudicating disputes is
unlawful.47
After articulating the principles, the Court applied the facts by first
stating them in one paragraph as summarized by the court of appeals.'
Finding all of Brenda Patterson's claims dealt with post-formation conduct
by the employer relating to the terms and conditions of continued
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2372. See supra note 25.
40. Id. at 2372-73. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
41. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
42. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
43. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
44. Id. at 2372.
45. Id. at 2373.
46. Id. (citation omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2373 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th
Cir. 1986)). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Syrup. 19901
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employment, it held that these claims were beyond § 1981's reach."' The
majority found solace in the fact that the type of race discrimination raised
by Brenda Patterson was "actionable under the more expansive reach of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."50
Moreover, the Court noted, extending work environment
challenges to § 1981 would undermine "the detailed and well-crafted
procedures for conciliation and resolution of Title VII, claims."1 In the
majority's view, reading an earlier statute broadly undermines the latter
statute. Even though the majority noted that after Patterson, some
overlap between § 1981 and title VII remained, their goal of preserving
title VII's integrity was accomplished without "sacrificing any significant
coverage of the civil rights laws."53 However, a comparison of the two
laws demonstrates their inherently crucial differences and the need for
both independent substantive provisions. 4
Although refuted by the majority,5 Justice Brennan argued that
§ 1981 makes racial harassment actionable when "the acts constituting
harassment [are] sufficiently severe or pervasive as effectively to belie any
claim that the contract was entered into in a racially neutral manner."56
Although this standard was not accepted by the majority for instances
arising when an employer refuses to make a contract, both the majority
and Justice Brennan agreed that racial harassment may be used as
evidence of discriminatory terms in the formation of a contract."' The
question to be asked, as stated by Justice Brennan, is whether the evidence
of racial harassment shows that, at the time of the formation of the
contract, the employer intentionally refused to enter into a contract with
the employee on racially neutral terms. 8
Justice Brennan's response to the majority's narrow reading of
§ 1981, similar to his response to the attempted overruling of Runyon,
49. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
50. Id. at 2374. See also infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text (a comparison of
the two statutes demonstrates that § 1981 is more expansive than title VII with respect to
race claims).
51. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374.
52. Id. at 2375.
53. Id. (footnote omitted).
54. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
55. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375-76.
56. Id at 2376 (citing id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2376-77.
[Vol. VII
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began with a detailed analysis of the legislative history of § 1981.11
C. History Ignored, But Not Yet Buried, Reveals That
Congress Intended to Bar Racial Harassment Through
§ 1981.
Even though the majority declined to "snatch away with one hand"
the entirety of § 1981, Justice Brennan refused to allow them to hide two
critical reasons for maintaining the Runyon Court's interpretation of §
1981. First, extensive legislative history demonstrated that Runyon was
correctly decided.60 Second, Congress ratified this original holding.61 As
previously stated, the majority failed to respond to Justice Brennan's
detailed explication of the pertinent legislative history. For the majority,
it was unnecessary to respond because no "special justification" existed to
depart from the doctrine of stare decisis.' However, the majority's failure
to respond to Justice Brennan's reading of history with respect to whether
§ 1981 makes racial harassment actionable is noteworthy.
As Justice Brennan wrote, the Court conducted "an ahistorical
analysis that ignore[d] the circumstances and legislative history of § 1981
[in narrowing the reach of this statute]." The absence of a sound
examination of the historical context that was present when § 1981 became
law can be seen in other 1988-89 Term civil rights cases as well."
59. Id. at 2379-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in sharp
contrast, the majority simply ignores the history, as if one of the most important parts of
American history never occurred).
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2371-72 n.1.
63. Id. at 2388. See Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affinmative Action and the
Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729,1761-73 (1989). In
discussing the Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.
Ct. 706 (1989), Professor Rosenfeld describes two forms of interpretation. First is the
"atomistic" mode which relies "on the disconnection of facts from the context in which they
are embedded. . . ." Id. at 1761. Second is the "ecological mode" which is "holistic and
systematic in nature, approaching social facts and events in terms of the interaction
between individuals, groups, and their social, political, and historical environment." Id. at
1762.
64. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (holding white firefighters in
Birmingham who failed to intervene in an earlier employment discrimination proceeding
in which consent decrees were entered could challenge employment decisions taken
pursuant to those decrees). Although not part of the record, the sordid and sad history
of the resistance to black freedom and basic constitutional rights as played out in
Birmingham should not be forgotten. In 1963, Chief of Police "Bull" O'Connor set his
police attack dogs on peaceful demonstrators, jailed thousands, and ordered the all-white
Syrup. 1990]
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Justice Brennan understood and examined the critical legislative
and social history in concluding that § 1981 encompasses claims of racial
harassment. 5 The actions of Congress in enacting § 1981 must be
examined in light of the historical conditions in 1866, at the close of the
bloody conflict fought to end slavery." When viewed in its entirety, the
legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to pass
comprehensive legislation that would outlaw all forms of discrimination or
fire department to aim high-pressured fire hoses at the demonstrators; how many of the
majority recall the bombing of the Birmingham black church that year that resulted in the
deaths of four young girls? Id. (emphasis in original); See also Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). Justice Blackmun poignantly criticized the majority's
revision of history, stating: "Sadly, [the Court's ruling] comes as no surprise. One wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination -- or, more accurately, race
discrimination against nonwhites -- is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it
ever was." Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Further, Justice
Stevens, in reviewing the facts of this case, noted that the segregation of housing and dining
facilities and job stratification along racial and ethnic lines in Wards Cove "bear an
unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy." Id. at 2127-28 n.4 (Stevens,
I., dissenting) (citing PLANTATION, TOwN AND COUNTY ESSAYS ON THE LOCAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVE SOCIErY 163-334 (E. Miller & E. Genovese eds. 1974).
See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). Justice Marshall
noted that Richmond, the former capital of the confederacy "knows what racial
discrimination is; a century of decisions by this and other federal courts has richly
documented the city's disgraceful history of public and private racial discrimination." Id.
at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA
IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963, at 756-901 (1988); D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:
MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
236-62 (1986); R. WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 68-72 (1990); McDougall, Social Movements, Law and
Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
83,102-11 (describing the Civil Rights Movement as building an "interpretive community").
65. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2388-89. See also id. at 2381-85 (Justice Brennan's
discussion of the legislative history supporting the interpretation that § 1981 covers private
as well as public discrimination).
66. Thousands of books have been written about slavery, the Civil War, and its
aftermath. See J. MCPHERSON, FREEDOM BOUND (1988) (estimating that over 50,000
titles have been published about the Civil War alone). Some of the seminal works about
the Reconstruction Era include: W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA 1860-1880 (1935); E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988); I. FREEDOM, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
EMANCIPATION 1861-1867 (Berlin ed. 1985); L LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO
LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1980); J. FRANKIN, RECONSTRUCION AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR (1961). For the legal history of the era, see Kaczorowski, To Begin the
Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST.
REV. 45 (1987); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L REV. 863 (1986).
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other attempts to subjugate former slaves, whatever the sources of those
attempts. Some actions that these provisions sought to interdict were the
official acts of various states, including the enactment of Black Codes.'7
Other actions which Congress was equally intent upon prohibiting were
those of private parties seeking to reintroduce slavery by every means
available to them.68
The Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had before
it strong evidence of the efforts by plantation owners to retain former
slaves under oppressive terms and conditions.' In a report to President
Andrew Johnson and Congress, General Carl Schurz detailed these
schemes and practices in 1865.70 This report played an important role in
the enactment of § 1981.
71
General Schurz observed that the former slaveholders simply
"adher[e], as to the treatment of laborers, as much as possible to the
traditions of the old system, even where the relations between employers and
laborers had been fixed by contract."72 Schurz noted that employers
attempted to "introduce into that new system [of contractual employment]
the element of physical compulsion."' He concluded that "[t]he habit is
so inveterate with a great many persons as to render, on the least
provocation, the impulse to whip a Negro almost irresistible."
74
Although this was sufficient legislative history for Justice Brennan
to conclude that Congress intended to encompass terms and conditions of
employment within § 1981, a fuller legislative history exists and lends
further support. For example, General Schurz appended to his report the
proposal of a group of Louisiana planters regarding the employment of
black workers.75 Schurz described this plan as "true representations of the
67. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2381. See also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW 83-84 (1980); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1955); A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS (1978).
68. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2380-83.
69. C. SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE STATES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA,
ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI AND LOUISIANA, S. EXEC. DOC. No. 2,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-15
(1865) [hereinafter REPORT OF C. SCHURZ].
70. Id. at 12.
71. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 428 (1968).
72. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis in original) (quoting REPORT OF C. SCHURZ, supra note 70, at 19).
73. See REPORT OF C. SCHURZ, supra note 70, at 19.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 22-
Symp. 1990]
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ideas and sentiments entertained by large numbers to-day [sic]."7' The
plan did not contemplate racial discrimination in hiring or firing; rather it
called for draconian conditions of employment." Farm laborers were to
work a sixty-hour week, and "[t]he rate of wages should be fixed -- above
which no one should be allowed to go."' Farm workers could neither
leave the plantation, nor receive visitors, without written permission of the
proprietor." Corporal punishment could be inflicted to correct many
abuses, and fines or imprisonment would be imposed on any laborers who
were not "respectful in tone, manner, and language to their employers..
"80
In early 1866, Congress organized the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction in an effort to follow up the Schurz Report.8' The Joint
Committee heard testimony that the planters refused to pay freedmen a
living wage.' In some instances, the freedmen received no wages at
all,' and the planters continued to resort to whipping and other acts of
cruelty.'
The southern states' legislation known as the Black Codes were of
great concern to the framers of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.' The Black
Codes were primarily concerned with controlling the terms and conditions
of black workers through direct or indirect means. The Codes did not
however, prevent blacks from entering into employment contracts."
However, proponents of the 1866 Act recognized and opposed
those aspects of the Black Codes which directly impinged the terms and
conditions of black employment. For example, Senator Wilson, in his
statement opening the debate on the Civil Rights bill, decried provisions
of a Georgia statutory proposal that "regulates contracts between master
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 84 (emphasis added) (appendix of "suggestions by a committee at a meeting
of planters" as to what is wanted before capital and time is invested in cultivating another
crop).
79. Id. at 85.
80. Id.
81. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 30,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
82. See generally id.
83. Id. at 54, 55.
84. Id. at 54.
85. See generally Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 132 (1981) (White, J.,
concurring); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 426, 432-33 (1968).
86. LAws IN THE RELATION TO FREEDMEN, S. EXEr. DOC. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 170 (1867) [hereinafter FREEDMEN LAWS].
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and servant.... [sets] [w]ork hours, from sunrise to sunset, [makes] [t]he
servant ... responsible for damaging the master's property [and allows]
[t]he employer [to] discharge servants for want of respect."
87
Considered in the light of this history, it is evident that § 1981 was
intended to reach beyond discrimination simply in hiring, firing, and
promotions, and also encompassed oppressive terms and all conditions of
employment. For the Patterson majority, the elaborate schemes to
reintroduce slavery by means of onerous terms and conditions of
employment is buried with the lives of the freedmen and those African-
American descendants who continue to be oppressed in the workplace by
conscious and unconscious forms of racism that flows from this history.
Thus, for Justice Brennan, the question in a § 1981 claim of racial
harassment should be
whether the acts constituting harassment were sufficiently
severe or pervasive as effectively to belie any claim that
the contract was entered into in a racially neutral manner.
Where a black employee demonstrates that she has
worked in conditions substantially different from those
enjoyed by similarly situated white employees, and can
show the necessary racial animus, a jury may infer that the
black employee has not been afforded the same right to
make an employment contract as white employees.'
As was noted by Justice Brennan and conceded at oral argument, if an
employer offers a black and a white applicant a contract on the same terms
but indicates that worse working conditions will exist for the black
applicant, the employer violates § 1981 for providing an unequal
contractY Therefore, for Justice Brennan, no relevant distinction exists
between this scenario and one where the different contractual conditions
are unspoken.
D. Brenda Patterson
Brenda Patterson worked ten years at McLean Credit Union, and
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865). See also FREEDMEN LAWS
supra note 86, at 180-86 (noting Louisiana measure authorizing penalties for "imprudence"
for "swearing to or in the presence of the employer, his family or agent" and for "bad
work").
88. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2389 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
89. Id.
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during that time was subjected to racial slurs, unequal work, demeaning
tasks, singled out for scrutiny and criticism, and denied promotions,
training and wage increases routinely given to other employees.' In
contrast to the majority's one paragraph summation of the facts, Justice
Brennan gives recognition to the reality of discrimination by discussing the
details of Brenda Patterson's employment in detail.91
Brenda Patterson was subjected to various forms of racial
harassment. The General Manager of McLean Credit Union told her a
number of times that "'blacks are known to work slower than whites by
nature,' or as he put it in one instance, 'that some animals [are] faster than
other animals.'"9 She received unequal work assignments, and when she
complained, she was given more work and was told that she should
consider quitting.' She testified about being given more demeaning tasks
than white employees.9 For instance, no other clerical worker was
required to dust and sweep.9 Further, she was the only clerical worker
whose work was not reassigned during vacations,91 and the General
Manager criticized the work of black employees publicly, while criticizing
white employees only in private meetings.' This type of racial
harassment is the modern-day equivalent of the oppressive terms and
conditions of employment that the 1866 Congress intended to make
unlawful under § 1981. As Justice Stevens wrote:
By requiring black employees to work in a hostile
environment, the employer has denied them the same
opportunity for advancement that is available to white
citizens. A deliberate policy of harassment of black
employees who are competing with white citizens is, I
submit, manifest discrimination in the making of contracts
in the sense in which that concept was interpreted in
Runyon v. McCrary ....
90. Id. at 2391.
91. Compare id. at 2391-93 (Justice Brennan's detailed treatment of the relevant
facts) with id. at 2368-69 (majority's treatment of facts).
92. Id. at 2392 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2391.
95. Id. at 2392.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2373 (majority opinion) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805
F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986) (testimony of petitioner)).
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The Court's repeated emphasis on the literal
language of § 1981 might be appropriate if it were
building a new foundation, but it is not a satisfactory
method of adding to the existing structure. In the name
of logic and coherence, the Court today adds a course of
bricks dramatically askew from "the secure foundation of
the courses laid by others," replacing a sense of rational
direction and purpose in the law with an aimless
confinement to a narrow construction of what itmeans to
"make" a contract."
III. CRITICAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN § 1981 AND TITLE VII
The majority, in reaching its conclusion that racial harassment is
not covered by § 1981, reasoned that title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
is "more expansive"" and that extending work environment challenges to
§ 1981 would undermine the integrity of title VII, particularly its
procedures for conciliation and resolution."°  With respect to race
discrimination, § 1981 is much broader in scope. 101 The following chart
graphically demonstrates the critical differences:
1. COVERAGE
TITLE VII Employers with 15 or more
employees."l
§ 1981 All employers.1'
2. BACK PAY
TITLE VII Limited to two years.'0
§ 1981 May be extended beyond two years.'
98. Id. at 2396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 2374 (majority opinion).
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 2391 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
103. Section 1981 would potentially reach 15% of the workforce not covered by title
VII. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2391 (citing Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of
Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L REV. 596, 602 (1988)).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
105. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
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3. DAMAGES
TITLE VII Limited to back pay.1' 6
§ 1981 Damages, including punitive in
appropriate cases.'
4. JURY TRIAL
TITLE VII No right to a jury trial."l
§ 1981 Right to jury trial."'
5. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
TITLE VII 180 or 240 day period."1
§ 1981 Generally longer because governed by
state personal injury statutes of
limitations."'
6. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION
TITLE VII Administrative exhaustion required."1
§ 1981 No administrative exhaustion required.
The chart makes vivid the significant differences between the two
statutes. The availability of damages and a jury trial in § 1981 actions are
particularly crucial. First, the possibility of damages makes it more likely
106. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
107. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460.
108. M. ROSSEIN, supra note 37, § 13.12, at 13-60 n.314 (1990).
109. Id. § 4.3(5).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). In non-deferral states, a complaint must be filed within
180 days. In states with an authorized deferred agency, complainants must file within 300
days of the alleged discriminatory act. Id. However, since the complaint must be referred
to the state agencies for 60 days, charges filed after the 240th day are likely to be
considered untimely. See M. ROSSEIN, supra note 37, § 12.4(1), at 12-7.
111. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). The States' statute of
limitations periods run from one to six years. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, SEcrION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES 59-61 (1986 & 1987 Supp.) (for a state-
by-state chart summarizing the applicable state limitation period).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). A private party must both file a timely charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and upon
receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC file a timely charge in federal court.
Additionally, in "deferral" states, the state fair employment agency may become involved
in the administrative process. The EEOC can retain a charge for 180 days, and often
longer. Id.
113. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
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that an attorney would represent a victim of discrimination. Second, the
award of damages beyond backpay gives employers a stronger incentive to
prevent potentially discriminatory practices by management.
The hostility of the judiciary to claims of discrimination also is why
the right to a jury is of heightened importance. President Reagan and
President Bush have appointed to the federal judiciary ideological
conservatives generally hostile to victims of discrimination."'
Increasingly, litigants would rather place the facts of discrimination before
a jury. To this end, the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 includes a
provision for a jury trial in title VII actions, thereby recognizing that the
right to a jury should be extended to women as well as people of color.lu
IV. POST-PATTERSON LITIGATION
The need for Congressional reversal of the Patterson decision
quickly became evident as the onslaught of § 1981 claims were dismissed
by the federal courts between June 15, 1989, and November 1, 1989.116
In a study conducted by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., (LDF), they found at least ninety-six § 1981 claims dismissed in fifty
different cases because of Patterson."7 Additionally, in a large number
of the dismissed racial harassment claims, the plaintiffs were black women
who alleged that they were also victims of sexual harassment."
114. In one study, although Reagan appointed judges whose views differed little from
those of other Republican judges, generally, in the area of discrimination suits they were
.more extreme." See Note, All The President's Men: A Study of Ronald Reagan's
Appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L REV. 766, 783 (1987).
115. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 8(a) (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 8(a) ('If compensatory or punitive damages are sought with respect to a claim of
intentional discrimination arising under this title, any party may demand a trial by jury.').
See also Pinzler, supra note 16, at 134 n.102; Appendix: Proposed Civil Rights Act of
1990, 7 N.Y.L ScH. HUM. RTS. 141, § 8, at 148.
116. See The Impact of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a report by the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 3-27 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Report of the
LDF].
117. See 223 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D1-D9 (Nov. 21, 1989). Although 22 out of
the 96 were claims of harassment, 31 were discharge claims, 16 promotion and 8
retaliation. See id. In an update of this study, the LDF found an additional 105 dismissals
as of February 23, 1990. See Additional Cases Dismissed Under Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union As of February 23, 1990 (on file with the author and the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc.).
118. See, e.g., Matthews v. Freedman, Darryl and McCormack, Taylor & Co., 882
F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1989); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1989);Dangerfield v. The Mission Press, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1171 (N.D. Ill.
1989); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 188 (D.
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One of the cases, Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,"9 illustrates the
insidious nature of racial harassment and other discrimination no longer
covered under § 1981. In Brooms, a thirty-six year old black woman was
employed for sixteen months as an industrial nurse at the Regal Tube
Company."' The district court found that Brooms' supervisor subjected
her to repeated explicit racial and sexual remarks, and in one instance
propositioned her. 2' The supervisor also displayed to her on two
occasions illustrations of interracial sexual acts, telling her that she was
hired to perform the depicted acts." After the supervisor threatened to
kill her, Brooms fled screaming and fell down a flight of stairs. 3 She
left her job and received two months disability pay for severe depression
caused by the repeated harassment, which resulted in her inability to work
on a permanent basis for several years."2 These findings appear
hauntingly similar to findings contained in the Schurz Report which, as
stated earlier, played a large role in Congress' adoption of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act.' 25 Nevertheless, after Patterson was decided, the Seventh
Circuit summarily dismissed the complaint because the claim did not relate
to "conduct at the initial formation of the [employment] contract.""
What discriminatory practices are forbidden by § 1981 is quite
unclear; the lower courts are already divided on some of these issues, and
a good deal of uncertainty lies ahead. Judge Posner recently asked, "[hiow
many plaintiffs can successfully negotiate the treacherous and shifting
shoals of present-day federal employment discrimination law?"12
7
In the event Patterson is not reversed by the Civil Rights Act of
1990, the next several years will bring uncertainty and confusion. Hostile
district court judges will be able to dismiss under Patterson virtually any
§ 1981 case not involving hiring discrimination. As demonstrated by the
LDF Study, some district court judges have already interpreted the broadly
framed passages in Patterson to conclude that § 1981 prohibits only
discrimination in hiring despite the existence of other language indicating
Kan. 1989); Busch v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11974 (N.D. Ill.); Harris v.
Home Savings Ass'n, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7015 (W.D. Mo.).
119. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Leong v. Hilton Hotels, 50 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 738 (D. Haw. 1989).





125. See REPORT OF C. SCHURZ, supra note 69, at 14. See also supra note 3.
126. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 424.
127. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989).
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that certain specific post-hiring discriminatory acts do remain
actionable.lss Other judges uphold non-harassment, post-hiring claims,
and it is this fundamental disagreement that will not only increase in
complexity but also in the number of cases it effects.'
Despite the substantial disagreements among the federal courts in
interpreting and applying Patterson, it is an unwarranted overreaction for
plaintiffs to abandon pending or potential § 1981 claims. Nevertheless,
responding to these new issues will require, at the very least, procedural
maneuvering. For instance, it may be critical -- particularly in harassment
cases -- to submit an amended complaint, adding or recasting allegations
to fall within the terms of Patterson.'" The following subsections discuss
post-Patterson issues of promotions, discharges and retaliation.
A. Promotions
In holding that some, but not all, promotion claims fall within the
scope of § 1981, the Court left the door ajar for a significant amount of
promotion claim litigation."' The court of appeals had found that
"[cilaims of racially discriminatory.., promotion go to the very existence
and nature of the employment contract and thus fall easily within § 1981's
protection." For the majority in Patterson however, this articulation
overstated the rule. Instead, the majority looked to:
whether the nature of the change in position was such
that it involved the opportunity to enter into a new
contract with the employer. If so, then the employer's
refusal to enter the new contract [with the employee] is
actionable under § 1981 .... Only where the promotion
128. See, e.g., Report of the LDF, supra note 116, at 12 (the numerous dismissals
since Patterson indicate that post-hiring discriminatory acts appear to be foreclosed or
"protected" by Patterson).
129. Id.
130. Some lower courts have indicated a willingness to allow such amendments. See
Cardona v. American Express, Inc., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1510, 1511-12 (S.D.
Fla. 1989); English v. General Dev. Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825, 826 (N.D.
Ill. 1989). It may be possible to replead a harassment case as a promotion case, rely on
the evidence of harassment to prove that the denial of a promotion was racially motivated,
and then use the common factual issues to add a pendent state claim that the harassment
violated state civil rights law.
131. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2378.
132. Id. at 2377 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th
Cir. 1986)). Justice Brennan agreed with the Fourth Circuit's formulation. Id. at 2934
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct
relation between the employee and the employer is such
a claim actionable under § 1981.133
The Court went on to hold that the district court had erred when
it instructed the jury that in order for the plaintiff to prevail, she had to
prove that she was better qualified than the employee who received the
promotion."'s In reality, the plaintiff need only show as part of her prima
facie case that she applied for and was qualified for an available positibn,
that she was rejected, and that after she was rejected respondent either
continued to seek applicants for an available position or filled the position
with a white employee.135  After the employer articulates a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the
reason was mere pretext.'3' This proof, the Court stated, can take a
variety of forms including evidence that the employer's claim to have
promoted a person more qualified is untrue because in fact she is better
qualified or that the employer had another reason for passing over her in
the promotional decision. 3 1 Here, evidence of the employer's past
treatment of the plaintiff, such as instances of racial harassment and failure
to train, could persuade the trier of fact that the employer's stated reason
for its decision was pretextual' m
Which promotion claims are and are not actionable under § 1981
will be addressed by the lower courts. Using traditional common law
principles is one helpful approach to ascertain whether or not a promotion
involves a "new contract." Comparing the obligations and rights of the
employer or the employee concerning the new and old positions is one
method to test whether a new contract has been formed. Two critical
questions are raised utilizing this approach. First, in the new position,
would the employer be entitled to require the employee to do tasks, or
work under conditions, that could not have been required in the old
133. Id. (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Justice Brennan
disagreed with this formulation, arguing that such a rule "display[s] nicely how [the
majority] seeks to eliminate with technicalities the protection of § 1981 was intended to
afford -- to limit protection to the form of the contract entered into, and not to extend it,
as Congress intended, to the substance of the contract as it is worked out in practice." Id.
at 2394-95 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 2377 (majority opinion). See also id. at 2393 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 2378 (majority opinion).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. See also id. at 2394 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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position? Second, in the new position, is the employer obligated to pay a
different salary or provide some other different form of compensation for
the work involved in the new job, whatever it might be? An affirmative
answer to either question would render the promotion claim actionable
under § 1981.
Of course, the answers to these questions are not necessarily
straightforward. For instance, with respect to the first question, the duties
of the new position are ill-defined. Some promotions involve only a
different title and salary in reward for excellent or long term service and
do not involve a change of duties. Answering the second question may
also involve uncertainty. For example, as a theoretical matter, a salary
increase alone might suffice to prove the existence of a new contract.
However, this could also be described as a "raise" rather than a
promotion.139 A plaintiff's strongest argument is to allege and prove that
both a change in salary and a change of duties were involved.1"
Judge Posner in Malhotra v. Cotter & Co. 4' suggested an analysis
of the meaning of Patterson that would be favorable to plaintiffs:
This interpretation emphasizes the anomaly created by a
rule that a stranger to the firm could sue under section
1981 if his application for a position was turned down on
racial grounds but a person already employed by the firm
could not sue even though his application for the
identical position was turned down on identical grounds.
Viewed in this light the "new and distinct relation" test
would distinguish such a case from one where promotion
139. See, e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989); Green v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 728 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1989).
140. Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989)
(promotion from clerk to supervisor with a consequent increase in responsibility and pay).
See also Green v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 728 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1989). The "new and
distinct relationship" raises other issues in different factual contexts. For example, what if
a single contract provided for different types of responsibilities and levels of salary? For
instance, an employment contract between a college teacher and a university might specify
that in the first year the teacher would be an assistant professor at $26,000 a year and in
the third year be an associate professor at $35,000 a year. The duties of the teacher, and
new salary obligations of the employer, would both be detailed in the original contract.
Another example is in the case of a hiring agreement in which the employer promised to
give the employee the next available position with a different salary.
In both of the above situations, there would be a point in time where the
individual would, under the original contract, have a right to that higher salary. However,
a refusal to pay the higher salary would merely constitute a breach of the contract,
therefore no "new contract" is involved, resulting in no claims under § 1981.
141. 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989).
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was the sort of routine advancement that only existing
employees qualify for. To get an in-grade promotion in
federal employment, for example, you must already be a
federal employee, and the "promotion" is a raise, rather
than a transfer to a new job. Complaints about
discrimination in routine "promotions" of this sort can no
longer be litigated under section 1981.142
However, Judge Posner's approach probably would exclude from coverage
genuine promotions (e.g., from patrol officer to sergeant) which public
employers always make from within its own workforce.
B. Discharge
The majority opinion in Patterson is silent concerning discharge.
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the 39th Congress
intended § 1981 "to go beyond protecting the freedmen from refusals to
contract ... and from discriminatory decisions to discharge" to reach racial
harassment as well. 43 While the majority expressly disagreed with
Brennan's view regarding harassment,' it conspicuously avoided any
comment about discharges. A week after Patterson was released, in Jett v.
Dallas Independent School District,'45 the Court in an opinion joined by
the Patterson majority, "assume[d] ... without deciding, that petitioner's
rights under § 1981 have been violated" by his removal from a job for
allegedly racial reasons.'"6 And, in Lytle v. Household Manufacturing,
Inc.,147 the petitioner alleged that he had been denied his right to a jury
trial in a § 1981 claim."' The Court in dicta, citing Justice Brennan's
separate opinion in Patterson, stated: "Had the District Court not dismissed
Lytle's § 1981 claims, Lytle would have been entitled to a jury trial on
142. Id. at 1311.
143. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
144. Id. at 2376 (majority opinion).
145. 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
146. Id. at 2710. The Court on five different occasions assumed that discriminatory
discharges were forbidden by § 1981. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656
(1987); St. Francis College v. AI-Krazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Delaware State College
v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 275
(1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
147. 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990).
148. Id. at 1334.
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these claims."149
There have been several favorable decisions on this issue since
Patterson."°  In Padilla v. United Air Lines," the court upheld the
discharge claim, because, after having been discharged, the plaintiff was
unable to get back his old job.157 The court found that Patterson did not
preclude termination as involving the formation process, reasoning that:
United's argument fails because termination is
part of the making of a contract. A person who is
terminated because of his race, like one who was denied
an employment contract because of his race, is without a
job. Termination affects the existence of the contract, not
merely the terms of its performance. Thus, discriminatory
termination directly affects the right to make a contract
contrary to § 1981.
I hold that Padilla's claim was actionable pursuant
to § 1981. Padilla did not simply complain that he was
harassed. Padilla's case was based upon the premise that
United discriminated against him because of his race...
by terminating him and by preventing him from obtaining
future employment with United."
149. Id. at 1335. The Court directed the Fourth Circuit to consider, on remand, the
impact of Patterson on Lytle's claims. Id. at 1336 n.3. The Fourth Circuit in Patterson
held that "[c]laims of racially discriminatory ... firing ... go to the very existence and
nature of the employment contract and thus fall easily within section 1981's protection."
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986). Accord Vance
v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1509 (1989). Cf. Flanagan v. Aaron E.
Henry Community Health Servs. Center, 876 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholds § 1981
claim, but does not discuss Patterson).
150. See Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 570 (D. Kan. 1989);
Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989); Gamboa v. Washington, 716
F. Supp. 353 (N.D. I1. 1989); Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16220 (W.D. Mo.).
151. 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989).
152. Id. at 490. United argued that the facts implicated performance of established
contract obligations and conditions of continued employment, thus this post-formation
conduct was not actionable. Id. at 489.
153. Id. at 490 (footnote omitted). In footnote 4, the court noted that the
defendant's refusal to reconsider the plaintiff for rehire was clearly unlawful under § 1981.
See id. at 490 n.4. Because the employer assigned Padilla to an "Ineligible for Rehire"
status, this action prevented him from entering into a future contract with United. It is
unclear from the district court opinion whether Padilla had actually applied for his old job,
or some other position, at United.
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In Jones v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers,154 the plaintiff, after being
dismissed as a truck driver, "requested a different job, offering to sweep
floors if necessary to stay employed. Defendant refused.""5 The district
court declined to dismiss the plaintiff's § 1981 claim:
[P]laintiff argues that Patterson does not require dismissal
here because, by requesting a different job, plaintiff was
attempting to make a new employment contract. The
argument is that, in refusing on the basis of race to make
a new contract, defendant violated § 1981. Such a claim
is actionable under Patterson."6
The arguments suggested in Jones and Padilla' present the most
promising basis for preserving discharge claims after Patterson."s
Formal employment contracts are not ordinary. If one exists, the
dismissal would involve two contracts -- the old contract the employer is
terminating, and the new contract into which the employer refuses to
154. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16220 (W.D. Mo.).
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490 n.4.
158. Id. The Fourth Circuit theory, that § 1981 protects the right to be in a
contractual relationship with an employer, seems broader than, and inconsistent with, the
Supreme Court's view that § 1981 protects only the creation of a contract, not the
continuation of or compliance with the contract. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986). Notwithstanding Padilla, termination is no more
'part of the making of a contract' than blowing up a bridge is part of building a bridge.
The suggestion in Birdwhistle that discriminatory termination falls within the enforcement
clause of § 1981 does not seem compatible with the limited interpretation of that clause
in Patterson. The simple termination of a contractual relation, even if wrongful and
racially motivated, does not easily fall within the Supreme Court's construction of § 1981.
Such a dismissal seems, with regard to the pre-existing contract, to be post-formation
conduct. See, e.g., Obago v. Union of Am. Hebrew Congregations, 52 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
In most cases, as a matter of fact and experience, a discharge involves both the
termination of a contractual relation and a refusal to contract anew. The employer's
ordinary intent in discharging an employee is not to employ that person again, precluding
layoffs for economic reasons. In contrast, most discharged employees desire their old jobs.
The discharged worker would not have appeared for work on the day of the dismissal if
the employee did not want the job. Employers know that the discharged worker, at the
time of the dismissal, wants his or her job back. In other words, the discharged employee
still wants to contract.
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enter. Most employees are covered by the employment-at-will
doctrine."5 9 These "at-will" employees offer their services daily and the
employer accepts by putting them to work. Professor Corbin characterized
the employment-at-will as "hiring-at-will."'" Judge Posner's "anomaly"
argument in Malhotra' works well in a discharge case. For example,
one black worker leaves work on Friday, and upon appearing for work the
following Monday is told by the personnel director that the company will
no longer hire blacks. A new black applicant is told the same message by
the director. Both the prospective and old workers are seeking work and
are denied work because of race.62 Nevertheless, some judges would use
Patterson to dismiss the § 1981 claim of the old worker, while permitting
the claim of the prospective worker.
Since Patterson created this "anomaly," cases previously
characterized as discharge claims now need to be pled as refusals to
contract. Three elements should now be pled and proved: (1) the
discharged employee nevertheless desired his or her job back; (2) the
employer knew of this desire in order to transform the employee into an
applicant; and (3) a vacancy existed. The ideal plaintiff would produce
evidence of a request for the job. An objection to or an appeal of the
dismissal would be strong evidence to prove elements one and two."
However, a plaintiff could argue that requesting rehire was futile under the
circumstances, but a constructive request should be recognized because the
employer knew of the desire.
Constructive discharge cases are more difficult to recast after
Patterson because it appears that it is the employee, not the employer, who
is refusing to contract. However, these cases can be pled as cases of
employer refusal to contract on equal terms with blacks and whites. If the
159. This concept has been described as follows:
Under the traditional rule governing employment
contracts, any hiring is presumed to be "at will";
that is, the employer is free to discharge
individuals for good cause, or bad cause, or no
cause at all, and the employee is equally free to
quit, strike, or otherwise cease work. Technically,
the rule operates on a principle of mutuality: both
the employer and the employee are free to
terminate their relationship at any time, without
reason and without notice.
ROTHSTEIN, KNAPP & LEIBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 738 (Foundation Press 1987).
160. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRArS § 70 (1952).
161. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989).
162. Id.
163. A formal grievance asking for reinstatement is one example.
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employer's unfair treatment forces blacks, but not whites, out of the
workplace, once more, there should be no different analysis if this
treatment was part of an initial employment offer.
C. Retaliation
Retaliation claims will probably have the most success if brought
within the equal enforcement provision of § 1981.'" The threat of
discharge for exercising a state court or a non-judicial method of enforcing
adjudication of disputes would be an effective deterrence to the
enforcement of a contract right. Any effort to "impede access to the
courts,"' or non-judicial forums, whether successful or not, would be
actionable under Patterson.
The majority expressly considered within the scope of § 1981 union
enforcement of labor contracts, a process that is usually "non-judicial."1"
Likewise, an employee complaining to company supervisors should also
consider resorting to non-judicial methods. This argument is strengthened
if there is a more formal grievance procedure, particularly where employers
encourage employees to utilize such internal processes.
In one post-Patterson retaliation case, Jourdan v. U.S. West Direct
Co.,167 the plaintiff had complained to company officials and filed charges
with the state civil rights commission." The court held that retaliation
for either the informal complaint or the state agency charge was actionable
under § 1981.'6 In addition, retaliation for the state agency charge
violated title VII.' ° In Justice Cudahy's concurring opinion in Malhotra
v. Cotter & Co., § 1981 claims based on retaliation for advocacy of
compliance with § 1981 were expressly approved." The judge reasoned
that where a statute or constitutional provision creates an affirmative,
substantive right, an employer who punishes an employee for exercising
those rights violates the law."' Otherwise the retaliation for exercising
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
165. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
166. Id.
167. 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 633 (D. Colo. 1989).
168. Id. at 636.
169. Id. at 637.
170. Id. at 634-35. See also Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1314 n.1 (Cudahy, J., concurring
(quoting Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373)) ("Clearly, when an employer punishes an employee
for attempting to enforce her rights under section 1981, this conduct 'impairs the
employee's ability to enforce her contract rights.'").
171. Id. at 1314-17.
172. Id. at 1314-16.
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the right nullifies the substantive right granted.1'3
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in the Patterson case represents one more signal to
the nation that a majority of the Supreme Court intends to erode the
national commitment to the eradication of racial and other forms of
discrimination. While the majority was unable to eliminate § 1981 with
one hand it proceeded to severely cripple the statute with the other hand
by restricting the reach of § 1981 in the employment context to the
formation of contracts. Rejecting Brenda Patterson's claim of racial
harassment was accomplished by ignoring the well documented legislative
and social history of racism that the 39th Congress found when it adopted
the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 is
critical to both reversing this decision and send the hostile majority a clear
message that racial and other forms of discrimination will not be tolerated.
173. Id. at 1314.

